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Utilizing a unique panel dataset of 273 listed firms in the Athens Stock 
Exchange (ASE) we explore the issue of capital market imperfections 
with respect to access to investment financing. In particular,  
we investigate the extent to which investment is sensitive to the 
availability of internal finance. By employing a fixed-effect model, our 
empirical results indicate a positive association of cash flow and 
investment, leading to the conclusion of imperfect substitutability 
between internal and external finance and thus the importance of  
the former for investment decisions. According to our knowledge,  
this is the first study covering the specific tremble period of ASE for 
Greek manufacturing firms. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
A large body of empirical research exploring the 
connection between alternative sources of finance 
and investment has grown rapidly over the past four 
decades. In particular, the effects of information 
asymmetries on firm’s investment decisions have 
been at the core of research interest. The question of 
whether or not the level of investment depends on 
corporate liquidity has drawn considerable attention 
since the seminal paper by Fazzari, Hubbard, 
Petersen, Blinder, and Poterba (1988). This is an 
important issue since the way investment responds 
to cyclical variations in profits relies on whether 
availability of internal funds constraints capital 
expenditure (Bond & Meghir, 1994). In perfect capital 
markets, firms are indifferent to funding their 
investment plans with internal or external funds, 
since external funds are a perfect substitute for 
internal capital. In this context, funding an 
investment project should solely depend on the 
project’s net present value. Along these lines, 
Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967) 
developed the so-called neoclassic theory of 
investment where investment is primarily governed 
by the user cost of capital. However alternative 
theories have shown that internal and external 
capital are maybe imperfect substitutes as a result 
of informational asymmetries between lenders and 
borrowers, linking investment decisions to the 
severity of financial constraints.  
Our paper focuses on the impact of liquidity, 
measured by cash flow, on investment spending for 
Greek listed firms. The empirical model adopts the 
Tobin’s q model (Tobin, 1969) and the sales 
accelerator model (Abel & Blanchard, 1986),  
both extended by including variables capturing firm 
specific characteristics, such as age and size,  
as the benchmark models that would be operational 
under the absence of financial constraints. Indeed, 
recent studies following the theory, do recognize  
the fact that the availability of the external financing 
instruments to a company is not irrelevant,  
and constraints arising from capital market 
imperfections should not be ignored (Attig, Cleary, 
El Ghoul, & Guedhami, 2012; Sangali, 2013; 
Sasidharan, Lukose, & Komera, 2015; Simmons-Süer, 
2018; Kallandranis, 2019; Tan & Avci, 2020). Hence, 
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should be expected that internal cash flow has a 
positive impact on investments undertaken by the 
firm and the impact is more evident for the 
financially constrained firms than the less 
financially constrained firms.  
To test the sensitivity of the relationship 
between investments in fixed capital and cash flow 
we used a fixed-effect regression model. The results 
showed that the company’s internal cash flow 
generation represents one of the main drivers of 
fixed investments. The remaining of the paper is 
organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the relative 
literature, Section 3 describes the dataset and the 
adopted methodology, Section 4 presents the 
estimation results, and finally, Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. LITERATURE REVIEW: WHY DOES CASH FLOW 
MATTER FOR INVESTMENT? A SUMMARY OF SOME 
CONTROVERSIAL CONCEPTS 
 
Early research on investment, especially the work of 
Meyer and Kuh (1957), stressed the significance of 
financing constraints in business investment. Most 
research since the middle 1960s, however, has 
isolated real firm decisions from financial factors, 
with Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrating the 
so-called irrelevance theorem, being a characteristic 
result of this isolation. Their main conclusion was 
that a firm’s financial structure will not affect its 
market value in perfect capital markets. Applied to 
capital expenditure, a firm’s financial status is 
irrelevant for real investment decisions in a world of 
perfect and complete capital markets. In particular, 
the neoclassical theory of investment developed by 
Jorgenson (1963) and Hall and Jorgenson (1967) 
advocate that a firm’s optimization problem could 
be solved without reference to financial factors 
qualifying the user cost of capital as the sole 
determinant of investment. 
In contrast, recent literature has shown that 
capital market imperfections in the form of 
asymmetry of information would typically lead to 
external funds being generally more costly than 
internal funds (Greenwald, Stiglitz, & Weiss, 1984; 
Mayers & Majluf, 1984; Bernanke & Gertler, 1990; 
Gertler, 1992). This cost differential, known as 
external finance premium, leads to a financial 
hierarchy under which firms in order to fund their 
investment plans first use their own (internal) 
resources and only turn to external funds 
(borrowing or issuing shares) as a last resort.  
Fazzari et al. (1988) in an innovative paper and 
a number of empirical studies that followed such as 
Gertler and Hubbard (1988) provided strong support 
for the existence of this financing hierarchy, which 
seems to be of greater importance for firms facing  
a high level of financial constraints. Fazzari et al. 
(1988) reported that investment decisions for more 
financially constrained firms exhibit higher 
sensitivity to firms’ liquidity when compared to less 
financially constrained firms. Fazzari et al. (1988) 
interpreted this as evidence for the existence of 
information-driven capital market imperfections.  
Subsequent studies have confirmed the central 
Fazzari et al. (1988) result by partitioning samples 
according to other a priori measures of financial 
constraint.1 Hubbard, Kashyap, and Whited (1995) 
examine, why the standard neoclassical model is not 
                                                          
1 For a good review, see Carreira and Silva (2010). 
compatible with samples of financially restricted 
firms, measured by a low pay-out ratio, while it is 
relatively successful for the unconstrained sample. 
They also demonstrate the importance of cash flow 
as an explanatory variable for investment behavior. 
Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991) adopted  
a similar procedure by dividing a sample of Japanese 
firms into two groups according to whether the firm 
had a close institutional relationship with a bank 
(keiretsu) or not. They conclude that the investment 
outlays of 24 Japanese manufacturing firms that are 
not members of a keiretsu are much more sensitive 
to firm liquidity than that of 121 firms that are 
members of a keiretsu and are deduced to be less 
financially constraint. The testable hypotheses in 
Hoshi et al. (1991) are mainly driven by incentive 
and information problems that raise the cost of 
external finance. The former, appear due to the fact 
that outside financing weakens management’s 
ownership stake leading to incentive problems that 
arise when managers control a company, but they do 
not own it (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The latter, 
stress that if managers are better informed than 
investors about a firm’s prospects, the firm’s risky 
securities will sometimes be underpriced, thereby 
raising the cost of external finance (Mayers & Majluf, 
1984). Hence, in both cases, managers find it more 
attractive in terms of cost of capital financing 
investment using internal funds. Thus, for firms 
facing information and incentive problems, liquidity 
will be an important determinant of investment.  
Vermuelen (2002) supports this line of 
reasoning by showing that firms with weak balance 
sheets, and hence, relatively adverse access to 
external financing exhibit stronger dependence on 
internal cash flows. Carpenter and Guariglia (2008) 
report that cash flow sensitivities are a reflection of 
underlying credit frictions as cash flow remains 
significant for investment even when investment 
opportunities are controlled for.  
Whited (1992) and Bond and Meghir (1994) 
employ an Euler equation approach to test  
the first-order condition of an intertemporal 
maximization problem. Both of these studies find 
the exogenous finance constraint to be particularly 
binding for the most constrained groups of firms, 
something that clearly supports the main result of 
Fazzari et al. (1988). A related study by Mayer (1990) 
examines the sources of industry finance of  
eight developed countries from 1970 to 1985, 
concluding that retentions are the leading source of 
finance, followed by bank finance (indirect 
borrowing) and then market sources of external 
finance (direct borrowing). 
Gertler (1988) has argued that information-
based financial constraints are likely to have a 
greater impact on small firms rather than large 
firms, partly because large firms tend to be mature 
and have more credible relations with providers of 
finance. The information-theoretic approach, 
therefore, implies that small firms are likely to be 
most dependent on internal finance and least 
dependent on external finance. Indeed, firms which 
are typically smaller and younger are positively 
related to the probability for SMEs to be financially 
constrained and thereby facing the increased 
likelihood of loan rejections and thus lowering their 
investment opportunities (Oliner & Rudebusch, 
1992; Schaller, 1993; Carpenter & Rondi, 2000; 
Drakos & Kallandranis, 2005; Drakos & 
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Giannakopoulos, 2011; Öztürk & Mrkaic, 2014; 
Liberti & Petersen, 2018). Mullier, Schoors, and 
Merlevede (2016) report that for constrained firms, 
which face a higher cost of debt, resort to alternative 
sources of financing like trade credit to finance their 
operations and have lower investment levels.  
For a special case of an intangible type of 
investments, Sasidharan et al. (2015), for a sample of 
Indian manufacturing companies find a significant 
positive relationship between a firm’s R&D 
expenditure and internal cash flow. In this line, 
Coban (2018), for a sample of Turkish firms 
advocates the sensitivity of internal finance to R&D 
investments and especially for young firms. Finally, 
recent studies (Duchin, Ozbas, & Sensoy, 2010; 
Campbell, Dhaliwal, & Schwartz, 2012; Chen & Chen, 
2012; Buono & Formai, 2019) dealing with the shock 
of the financial crisis show that investment dropped 
significantly during that period and this decline was 
greatest for firms that are financially constrained 
but do not relate this to excess cash flow sensitivity. 
While there is considerable support for the 
Fazzari et al. (1988) results, a debate over the 
generality of the above conclusions is still ongoing. 
In fact, there now seems to be significant evidence 
supporting an opposing view. Kaplan and Zingales 
(1995) classify firms according to their degree of 
financial constraint into three categories: not 
financially constraint, possibly financially constraint, 
and financially constrained, based on qualitative  
and quantitative information. They find that the 
most financially constrained group actually displays 
the lowest sensitivity of investment to cash flow of  
the three groups, a result that obviously challenges 
Fazzari et al. (1988). Contrary to previous evidence, 
they claim that investment-cash flow sensitivities 
provide no evidence for the presence of financing 
constraints. However, Kaplan and Zingales (1995) 
main criticism of Fazzari et al. (1988) was directed 
to the small sample size analyzed and the 
classification criteria used. Kaplan and Zingales’ 
(1995) results were subsequently confirmed by 
several studies (Cleary, 1999, 2006; Cleary, Povel, & 
Raith, 2007). Indeed, Cleary (1999) following the 
approach of Kaplan and Zingales (1995) extends the 
sample, showing that while all firms are sensitive  
to liquidity, consistent with previous evidence, firms 
that are more creditworthy exhibit greater 
investment-liquidity sensitivity than those  
classified as less creditworthy as Kaplan and 
Zingales (1995) advocate.  
As it becomes apparent from this brief review 
there is clearly a controversy here. The empirical 
literature has supported opposing views on the 
impact of financial constraints on the cash  
flow-investment relationship. One set of the 
literature following Fazzari et al. (1988) argue that 
financial constraints are important in the 
investment-cash flow relationship, while the other 
one following Kaplan and Zingales (1995) support 
that the investment-cash flow sensitivity criterion as 
a measure of financing constraints is not well-
grounded in theory and is not supported by 
empirical evidence. 
 
3. METHODOLOGY AND DATA DESCRIPTION 
 
3.1. Methodology 
 
Fazzari et al. (1988) explored the nexus between 
financing constraints and investment activity 
conditioning on the neoclassical, sales accelerator, 
and Tobin’s q models. In particular, the null 
hypothesis was that under the absence of capital 
market imperfections a firm’s investment decision 
and cash flow funds should be unrelated. 
Consequently, if a positive and significant 
relationship between cash flow and investment was 
uncovered would signify the presence of market 
imperfections. As mentioned earlier, conditioning is 
given by three alternative baseline models; the 
neoclassical (Jorgenson, 1971), the sales accelerator 
model (Abel & Blanchard, 1986), and the Tobin’s q 
model (Tobin, 1969).  
In the neoclassical model, the user cost of 
capital is the main determinant of corporate 
investment. Due to the lack of reliable data for the 
user cost of capital, we will focus only on the other 
two models. The intuition behind Tobin’s q model is 
that absent considerations of taxes or capital market 
imperfections, a value-maximizing firm will invest as 
long as the shadow value of an additional unit of 
capital, marginal q, exceeds unity. However, 
estimating q models is not without problems for 
various reasons. Firstly, it is difficult to measure  
the replacement value of assets, since it is not 
reported in most European countries. Secondly, to 
the extent the stock market is excessively volatile, 
something that did occur during the sample period 
in the Greek market, q may not reflect market 
fundamentals (Goergen & Renneboog, 2001). Thirdly, 
the theoretical model requires the measurement of  
a project’s marginal q. Data considerations however 
allow the researcher to only calculate the average q. 
In this context, Chirinko and Schaller (1995) show 
that average Tobin’s q is flawed as it reflects  
the average return on a company’s total capital 
whereas it is the marginal return on capital that is 
relevant. According to this approach, investment  
is determined according to: 
 
(
    
      
)       (    )    (
     
      
)    (      )    (       )                     (1) 
 
where i identifies a company, t refers to the time 
period,         are unknown parameters to be 
estimated, and   is a well-behaved error term.  
I denotes investment expenditure, q controls for  
the market’s evaluation of the firm’s investment 
opportunities, CF is the value of internal funds,  
AGE is the age of the firm since the year of 
foundation, SIZE is the value of the firm’s  
total assets, and K is the beginning-of-period  
capital stock. 
Even though the q investment model has many 
attractive features, in practice, however, other 
approaches like the sales accelerator model have 
shown superior empirical performance. The sales 
accelerator model introduced by Abel and Blanchard 
(1986) does not include expectations about the 
company’s growth potential and assumes that 
investment grows with sales. The relevant empirical 
version of that is: 
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where         are unknown parameters to be 
estimated,    and      are current and one year 
lagged sales, capturing growth opportunities. 
Additionally, we consider a combined-general 
empirical specification model where equations (1) 
and (2) are merged: 
 
(
    
      
)       (    )    (
    
      
)    (
      
      
)    (
     
      
)    (      )    (       )                     (3) 
 
where         are unknown parameters to be 
estimated, the rest as before.  
As it becomes apparent the more general 
model in equation (3) nests the sales accelerator and 
Tobin’s q models, which can be obtained by 
imposing appropriate zero restrictions on the 
general model parameters. We employ the 
specification in equation (3) since according to 
Fazzari et al. (1988) it is typical to find significant 
effects of both sales and Tobin’s q.  
Partitioning the sample is a common feature in 
many empirical studies, procedure though which 
may create problems related to the method of 
splitting the sample. Arbitrarily restricting a firm 
belonging to the group of financially constrained or 
unconstrained over the entire sample period is 
suboptimal since it is possible that firms face 
financial constraints of varying intensity at different 
points in time. Moreover, there are concerns 
regarding the endogeneity of the sample splitting 
criteria. Finally, partitioning firms on the basis of  
a single indicator (such as the dividend payout ratio 
or size) may not be a sufficient statistic for the 
existence of financial constraints. For these reasons, 
we choose not to split the sample and treat firms as 
a homogeneous group. 
 
3.2. Data description  
 
We have collected the balance sheets of 273 (parent) 
companies listed in the Athens Stock Exchange (ASE) 
for the period 1997-2001. The source is the Yearly 
Statistical Bulletin, published by the ASE.2 The 
selection of the period was made on purpose as 
within this time the ASE experienced a spiky incline 
and a subsequent sharp decline, despite the fact that 
the economic fundamentals of the country were not 
harmed significantly, and Greece successfully joined 
the Eurozone in 2001. 
In equations (1) to (3), I represents investment 
in plant and equipment. CF represents internal 
funds and is measured as the sum of net operating 
profits and depreciation ratio. S stands for sales, 
while SIZE is calculated as the logarithm of the value 
of total assets and AGE is measured as the logarithm 
of the number of years in operation. AGE and SIZE 
are introduced in order to capture firm-specific 
characteristics since we believe that these variables 
may contain important information for firm 
investment. Finally, Tobin’s q has been computed 
following the methodology outlined in Salinger and 
Summers (1983). All variables are divided by the 
beginning-of-period capital stock K.3 
                                                          
2 Banks, leasing, holding and insurance companies were excluded from the 
sample. Four companies whose stock was under suspension were also 
excluded. By the end of 2001 the total number of listed firms in ASE was 
364. Hence, the sample of manufacturing companies covers the 75 per cent of 
the market. 
3 Tables offering data descriptions and summary statistics appear in the 
Appendix A. 
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
A fixed-effects estimation procedure4, with 
intercepts allowed to vary across firms, was 
employed to examine the relationship between 
investment and internal cash flows. The Hausman 
(1978) test indicated fixed effects as the appropriate 
specification. Table 1 reports the estimated results 
for equations (1) to (3). The first column of Table 1 
presents estimates of the q investment model, 
including cash flow, age, and size. 
The results show a significant positive cash 
flow coefficient within the q framework, indicating 
the presence of capital market imperfections. 
Contrary to what was expected, the coefficient of q 
turned out to be negative although insignificant. We 
suspect that this is due to 1) problems related to 
mismeasurement of q, and 2) stock market 
volatility.5 A large number of studies such as 
Hubbard and Kashyap (1992)6 have noted the 
difficulty in establishing the empirical significance 
of q. Various explanations for its low explanatory 
power have been cited with most related to the 
difference between the market assessment of firms 
and the firms’ own internal assessments. The high 
investment liquidity sensitivity for equation (1) 
seems to be along the lines of the existing empirical 
literature. This finding is consistent with the basic 
conclusion of Fazzari et al. (1988) who reported that 
investment decisions exhibit high sensitivity to 
firms’ liquidity. It also concurs with the results of 
Mayer (1990) who documents the dominant role  
of internal financing in investment decisions, which 
implies that investment policy for the majority of 
firms is sensitive to current liquidity. Finally, our 
results are also compatible with the findings of 
Hubbard et al. (1995) who display the importance  
of cash flow as an explanatory variable for 
investment. In the second column, we test whether 
the pattern of cash flow effects holds up in models 
that include sales since one plausible explanation for 
the effect of cash flow is that internal finance is 
correlated with sales, while in the third column  
we report estimation results for the general model.  
 
                                                          
4 For space considerations estimation results obtained using the random 
effects estimator is not reported here, even though the results do not change 
dramatically. The results are available upon request. 
5 The beginning to end of year share price index growth rate for 1996-1997, 
1997-1998, 1998-1999, 1999-2000, 2000-2001 was 58.5%, 85%, 102.2%,  
-38.8%, and -23.5% respectively. 
6 They argue that q may be an imprecise measure because of imperfect 
competition and non-constant returns to scale. 
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Table 1. Estimation results (dependent variable: investment) 
 
Variable/Model 
Tobin’s q model 
(1) 
Sales accelerator model 
(2) 
(1) + (2) 
q
 
-0.01 
(-1.29) 
- 
-0.01 
(-1.41) 
SALES
 
- 
0.07 
(5.41)** 
0.12 
(5.69)** 
SALES LAGGED
 
- 
-0.00 
(-0.18) 
0.00 
(0.06) 
CASH FLOW
 
0.56 
(5.71)** 
0.39 
(4.68)** 
0.26 
(2.45)** 
AGE
 
-0.20 
(-0.55) 
0.01 
(0.04) 
-0.16 
(-0.46) 
SIZE
 
0.57 
(5.04)** 
0.51 
(7.74)** 
0.62 
(5.28)** 
       
0.15 
(2.13)** 
0.11 
(2.48)** 
0.13 
(1.78)* 
       
0.22 
(3.41)** 
0.16 
(3.77)** 
0.22 
(3.29)** 
       
0.23 
(4.89)** 
0.14 
(4.51)** 
0.21 
(4.38)** 
       
0.14 
(3.91)** 
0.10 
(3.70)** 
0.13 
(3.47)** 
R2 9.56 % 11.19 % 12.32 % 
F-test 
13.28 
(p-value 0.00) 
20.85 
(p-value 0.00) 
14.60 
(p-value 0.00) 
Time dummies 
X2  test 
7.57 
(p-value 0.00) 
6.46 
(p-value 0.00) 
6.45 
(p-value 0.00) 
Note: value in brackets t-stat. (*) denotes significance at the 10% level and (**) denotes significance at the 5% level.  
The hypothesis of zero time effects is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
 
Both in the second and third column current 
sales are strongly significant indicating that 
investment is positively affected by current sales, 
whereas in contrast lagged sales seem to exert no 
effect. The cash flow coefficient remains 
significantly positive supporting the presence of 
imperfection in capital markets. Results for 
equations (2) and (3) are in line with those reported 
by Fazzari et al. (1988) who present estimated 
equations that include cash flow, current and lagged 
values of sales. However, the effect of q remains 
insignificant in equation (3).  
Following, Hadlock and Pierce (2010) who 
suggested that age and size are the two most 
significant variables reflecting the existence of 
financial constraints, we examine their effect on 
investment spending. Across all three equations, age 
coefficients are negative, although statistically 
insignificant, while size appears to be a significant 
determinant in the investment process, affecting it 
positively. Though it was expected influence of 
firms’ age on the cash flow-investment relationship 
this is not apparent revealing no actual impact 
(Freel, Carter, Tagg, & Mason, 2012). We suspect that 
age is not significant given that age differences 
between firms in our sample are not pronounced 
considering that typically a firm reaches a certain 
level of maturity before it is listed.7 
The significance of size is consistent with 
empirical studies, such as Devereux and Schiantarelli 
                                                          
7 In order a firm to go on with an IPO, there are certainn criteria to be 
achieved. Firms should present minimum of three consecutive years of 
profitability and a minimum equity value. This means that a firm cannot be 
relatively young in a strict manner. 
(1990) who report that large firms are more sensitive 
than small firms to cash flow fluctuations using  
a sample of relatively large quoted firms. Along this 
line, Athey and Laumas (1994) find that large Indian 
firms are more sensitive to cash flow than small 
firms and explain their result as evidence of  
the Indian government credit policies for promoting 
small companies.  
The fact that a firm must be listed to be 
included in the sample means that there is probably 
a selection bias in favor of picking only the best of 
small firms (Schiantarelli, 1996). Hu and 
Schiantarelli (1994) find that everything else  
equal, size is positively related to the probability of 
being financially constraint for listed firms present 
continuously between 1978 and 1987 in the 
Compustat Annual Industrial File and  
the Over-the-Counter File. Overall, size seems to be  
a useful criterion in order to signify firms that are 
likely to be financially constrained, but only when 
the sample used contains a portion of the lower 
sized firms in the whole range of size. Finally, time 
dummies were found to have a significant effect on 
capturing differences in investment decisions  
from year to year.8 
In Table 2, we report the results after 
augmenting the models by lagged cash flow. Our 
estimation shows that our basic conclusions are not 
sensitive to incorporating lagged cash flow, which 
has an insignificant effect on investment. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
8 We also test the hypothesis of including or not the time dummies. 
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Table 2. Estimation results (dependent variable: investment) 
 
Variable/Model 
Tobin’s q model 
(1) 
Sales accelerator model  
(2) 
(1) + (2) 
q
 
-0.03 
(-2.04)** 
- 
-0.04 
(-2.40)** 
SALES
 
- 
0.12 
(2.43)** 
0.15 
(2.41)** 
SALES LAGGED
 
- 
0.00 
(0.10) 
-0.00 
(-0.05) 
CASH FLOW
 
1.12 
(4.61)** 
0.77 
(4.27)** 
0.79 
(2.83)** 
AGE
 
-0.26 
(-0.63) 
-0.18 
(-0.52) 
-0.26 
(-0.64) 
CASH FLOW LAGGED 
-0.00 
(-0.09) 
0.01 
(0.19) 
-0.01 
(-0.12) 
SIZE
 
0.84 
(5.18)** 
0.52 
(5.71)** 
0.77 
(4.65)** 
       - - - 
       
0.29 
(3.40)** 
0.12 
(2.26)** 
0.24 
(2.80)** 
       
0.19 
(3.10)** 
0.09 
(2.23)** 
0.18 
(2.89)** 
       
0.12 
(2.79)** 
0.08 
(2.45)** 
0.10 
(2.47)** 
R2 8.42 % 9.99 % 8.31 % 
F-test 
10.58 
(p-value 0.00) 
12.36 
(p-value 0.00) 
9.18 
(p-value 0.00) 
Time dummies 
X2  test 
4.68 
(p-value 0.00) 
2.57 
(p-value 0.05) 
3.52 
(p-value 0.01) 
Note: value in brackets t-stat. (*) denotes significance at the 10% level and (**) denotes significance at the 5% level.  
The hypothesis of zero time effects is rejected at the 5% significance level. 
 
The empirical work in this article focuses on 
Greece’s firms that are publicly traded. Recall, that 
financing constraints are the outcome of 
informational asymmetries. These asymmetries tend 
to be less severe as the level of transparency 
regarding firms’ activities and governance increases. 
Publicly traded firms, like those in our sample, are 
expected to be associated with the lowest degree of 
informational symmetries. Therefore, our findings of 
investment sensitivity on liquidity for this particular 
group of firms would probably be more pronounced 
for non-listed firms especially in a small economy 
such as that of Greece. 
 
5. CONCLUSION 
 
We empirically explored the sensitivity of firm 
investment decisions to the availability of internal 
financing for a panel of 273 Greek listed firms over 
the 1997 to 2001 period. In order to find robust 
estimates, we examined two reduced form 
specifications, the sales accelerator model and the 
Tobin’s q model. In particular, by employing a fixed 
effect estimation technique, we argued that cash 
flow really matters when considering its effects on 
investment and especially on those of tangible 
assets, indicating the existence of capital market 
imperfection in the Greek market. Besides, firm 
specific characteristics are included in order to 
capture the existence of financing constraints and 
asymmetric information. Our findings highlight that 
cash flow effects are not found to be dependent on 
firm age but only on size.  
Our results follow the mainstream of the 
empirical literature of capital market imperfections 
(Fazzari et al., 1988; Hubbard et al., 1995) in which 
context cash flow serves as an explanatory variable 
for investment. Indeed, such imperfections should 
force policymakers to ponder on the question  
how they could further alleviate these financial 
frictions and make investment and economic growth 
less dependent on internally generated cash flows 
for publicly traded firms. The only way out of  
this puzzle for policymakers is to enhance even 
more information sharing among participants in  
the credit market in order to improve the availability 
of finance to finance seekers. According to Freel  
et al. (2012) in countries that have achieved to 
reduce information asymmetries, firms have easier 
access to credit. Another major concern for  
the policymakers may be the finding that listed 
companies despite their advantageous position 
relative to non-listed companies are facing  
financing constraints even during periods when the 
Greek economy was performing better than  
the European average. 
In spite of a robust empirical analysis, our 
study is not free from limitations. Future research 
should extend the sample covering a longer time 
span and also apply dynamic panel techniques. 
Besides, our results would be further reinforced if 
future studies affirm our findings within a different 
context of the traditional investment-cash flow 
sensitivities. In particular, other important types of 
investments such as inventory investment or R&D 
investments is an interesting path for future 
research. Besides, important issues that may cause 
financial constraints like the concentration of share 
ownership and the monitoring role played by 
institutional shareholders, the level of flexibility on 
the local credit market, and specific institutional 
characteristics of the Greek market, could be  
a challenge for future research. However, the data 
limitation prevented us from undertaking such  
an exercise. 
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APPENDIX A 
 
Table A.1. Data description* 
 
Variable name Symbol Definition 
Tobin’s q** q
 
(E+TDBT-INV)/PK 
SALES
 
S/K
 
Total Sales 
CASH FLOW
 
CF/K
 
Net Operating Profit + Depreciation on fixed assets 
AGE
 
AGE
 
Log(Date of observation-Date of foundation) 
SIZE
 
SIZE
 
Log (Total Assets) 
INVESTMENT I/K
 
 i ed Assets     i ed Assets       
Note: * variables are divided by the beginning-of-period capital stock K. ** Tobin’s q: Represents the investment 
opportunities facing the firm. Average Q is measured as q = (E+TDBT-INV)/PK, where E represents the sum of the 
value of the firm’s common and preferred stocks, TDBT represents the total debt of the firm and INV is the value of 
the firm’s inventories. PK is the replacement cost of the firm’s capital stock. 
 
Table A.2. Summary statistics (273 firms, 1997-2001) 
 
Variables Mean Median Max. Min. Std. dev. 
INVESTMENT 
 
0.17 0.07 3.73 -0.74 0.35 
CASH FLOW 
 
0.11 0.08 2.88 -0.60 0.20 
SALES  0.85 0.72 19.87 0.00 1.02 
SIZE 
 
7.72 7.70 9.87 6.29 0.52 
AGE
 
1.40 1.41 2.09 0.30 0.30 
TOBIN’s q 2.08 1.18 17.91 -4.81 2.74 
 
